{"id":985,"date":"2026-02-04T14:07:06","date_gmt":"2026-02-04T14:07:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sterlingcooper.info\/blog\/?p=985"},"modified":"2026-02-04T14:07:06","modified_gmt":"2026-02-04T14:07:06","slug":"chinese-students-infiltrated-usa-universities-and-pose-security-issues","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.sterlingcooper.info\/blog\/chinese-students-infiltrated-usa-universities-and-pose-security-issues\/","title":{"rendered":"CHINESE STUDENTS INFILTRATED USA UNIVERSITIES AND POSE SECURITY ISSUES"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"node__title\">\n<h1 class=\"h1\">Chinese students with CCP membership, military links \u2018infiltrate\u2019 U.S. universities, watchdog says<\/h1>\n<p class=\"summary__paragraph\">Students, or spies? New report warns of &#8220;infiltration&#8221; of America&#8217;s colleges and universities by Chinese students with links to the CCP and blacklisted Chinese companies.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"node__main_content\">\n<div class=\"node__text node__text--long node__text--full-article\">\n<div class=\"text-long\">\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Chinese students and scientists who are members of the Chinese Communist Party, attended schools tied to the Chinese military or worked with companies connected to Beijing&#8217;s theft of U.S. technology have \u201cinfiltrated\u201d several top American universities, according to a watchdog group report that raises fresh concerns about America&#8217;s vulnerabilities to its most fierce adversary.<\/p>\n<p>A conservative non-profit oversight group, the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com\/?url=https%3A%2F%2Famericanaccountabilityfoundation.com%2F&amp;data=05%7C02%7C%7C24b73d211836413a1b6508de63975cb4%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C639057698906943100%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=TdFSWTmwxmfiSsD2PrlQKSUKRPaFmdlKIyBYB9TZt5M%3D&amp;reserved=0\">American Accountability Foundation<\/a>, reported that it found nearly two dozen Chinese academics working at elite U.S. schools and labs\u00a0\u201cwho because of the dual-use threat of their research, close ties to the military research sector in China, and\/or clear ties to the Chinese Communist Party should be expelled from the United States or never be re-admitted.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The research document \u2014 titled\u00a0&#8220;<em>Chinese Scientist Infiltration Threat Assessments<\/em> &#8221; \u2014 <a href=\"https:\/\/justthenews.com\/sites\/default\/files\/2026-02\/AAF%20-%20Chinese%20Scientist%20Infiltration%20-%20Threat%20Assessments.pdf\">says<\/a> that Chinese students working at some of America\u2019s top colleges, often receiving U.S. federal funding (some of it from the Pentagon) to conduct research into advanced technologies have troubling backgrounds which could pose a risk to U.S. national security.<\/p>\n<h5><strong>Many Chinese scientists at U.S. institutions have CCP connections<\/strong><\/h5>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The concerns raised by AAF\u2019s new report include the fact that some of the Chinese scientists ensconced inside American academia and at cutting-edge U.S. labs appear to be members of the CCP and are affiliated with the CCP\u2019s projects aimed at stealing U.S. technological know-how or military secrets, and worked with or for companies which serve the Chinese defense industry.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Some of these Chinese academics have clear links to problematic Chinese firms like <a href=\"https:\/\/www.packtpub.com\/en-bg\/learning\/tech-news\/us-blacklist-chinas-telecom-giant-huawei-over-threat-to-national-security\">Huawei<\/a> or to China\u2019s notorious <a href=\"https:\/\/www.fbi.gov\/investigate\/counterintelligence\/the-china-threat\/chinese-talent-plans\">Thousand Talents<\/a> program, of which <a href=\"https:\/\/www.fbi.gov\/investigate\/counterintelligence\/the-china-threat\/chinese-talent-plans\">the FBI said<\/a> &#8220;American businesses, universities, and laboratories should understand the potential risks and illegal conduct incentivized by Chinese talent plans and take steps to safeguard their trade secrets and intellectual property.&#8221; At least one of the Chinese scientists appeared to have been employed by the Chinese government while in the U.S.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The schools employing the Chinese scientists named in the AAF report include Harvard University, Carnegie Mellon, Cornell University, Brown University, Purdue University, the University of Wisconsin, Georgia Tech, the University of Florida, the University of Michigan, University of Florida, Penn State University, the Stevens Institute of Technology, Michigan State University, Indiana University, and the University of Southern California, as well as Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The research areas focused on by these Chinese students \u2014 many of whom are receiving U.S. government funding for the lab research they are doing in the U.S. \u2014 include unmanned aerial drones, robotics, exoskeletons, artificial intelligence, large language models, viral research into highly-infectious pathogens, advanced materials research, next-gen semiconductors, advanced laser welding, quantum sensing, nuclear materials research, thermal-resilient electronics, electrical grid technologies, pharmaceuticals, applied mathematics, condensed matter physics, and other key areas which could have dual-use military applications.<\/p>\n<h5><strong>U.S. is funding research by Chinese students with questionable histories<\/strong><\/h5>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Funding for many of these Chinese students has come from varied sources such as the Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, the U.S. Army Research Lab, the Office of Naval Research, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, National Laboratories, and other U.S. federal agencies.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The House Select Committee on the CCP had\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/chinaselectcommittee.house.gov\/media\/reports\/from-phd-to-pla\">assessed<\/a> just last year that \u201cthe CCP does not treat overseas study as an apolitical or purely academic exercise\u201d but rather that \u201cunder its state-directed technology acquisition strategy, international education is viewed as a key vector for accessing cutting-edge science, engineering, and defense-related knowledge.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The same House committee also\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/chinaselectcommittee.house.gov\/sites\/evo-subsites\/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov\/files\/evo-media-document\/doe_report_containment_breach_final_v4_compressed-1.pdf\">warned<\/a> about \u201ca pervasive and deeply troubling pattern of U.S. taxpayer-funded research being conducted in collaboration with Chinese entities that are directly tied to China\u2019s defense research and industrial base.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Thomas Jones, the president of AAF, said in his research firm\u2019s new report that he was warning about the \u201cinfiltration of the United States research enterprise by scientists and engineers from the People\u2019s Republic of China.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Jones argued that \u201cthe results are sobering; there are numerous examples of active members of the Chinese Communist Party being appointed to sensitive positions at U.S. universities and Chinese researchers being placed in positions that will allow them to transfer technology and research to the People\u2019s Liberation Army and cultivate relationships with critical defense researchers in the U.S.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><em>Just the News<\/em> requested comment from all 21 of the Chinese students named in the AAF report as being potential \u201cthreats\u201d to the U.S., with none of the academics responding.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><em>Just the News<\/em> also requested comment from all the U.S. universities which had most recently employed or currently employ the Chinese scientists.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">USC said it would provide a comment, but did not. The University of Florida confirmed one of the Chinese students in question had been at the school but &#8220;left UF in 2025 in good standing&#8221; without answering further questions. Michigan State said that &#8220;any inquiries regarding the employment status of a particular individual at the university must be made through the Freedom of Information Act.&#8221; The Stevens Institute said that the Chinese academic in question &#8220;was a visiting scholar at Stevens from January 2024 through September 2025&#8221; and that &#8220;visiting scholars are unpaid and spend their time\u00a0observing\u00a0and\u00a0assisting\u00a0existing university faculty.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">No other schools responded to a request for comment.<\/p>\n<h5><strong>Multiple Chinese students are or have been members of the CCP<\/strong><\/h5>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The new AAF report revealed that multiple Chinese students now at U.S. universities had been members of the Chinese Communist Party, including holding leadership positions inside the local CCP branches of their Chinese universities. The CCP, a Marxist-Leninist party, won the Chinese civil war under the leadership of Mao Zedong, who ruled the country after establishing the People\u2019s Republic of China in 1949. Some reports say an estimated <a href=\"https:\/\/www.heritage.org\/china\/commentary\/the-legacy-mao-zedong-mass-murder\">65 million Chinese<\/a> died as a result of Mao\u2019s repeated, merciless attempts to create a new \u201csocialist\u201d China.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Also named in the AAF report was a Chinese scientist who had worked at an American university and who had been a leader within the CCP-controlled China Democratic League (CDL).<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The CIA\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cia.gov\/readingroom\/docs\/CIA-RDP78-00915R000600210003-9.pdf\">assessed<\/a> as far back as 1957 that the CDL has \u201cplayed a leading role under the CCP\u201d in the Chinese government, and argued that \u201cthere is little if anything to distinguish between the doctrines of the CDL and CCP.\u201d The CIA said that the CDL \u201cis believed to serve clandestinely the interests of the Chinese Communists in some areas where diplomatic representation is not established and where Communist activities as such would meet with local government opposition.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission in 2018\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uscc.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/Research\/China%27s%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20-%20Background%20and%20Implications%20for%20US_final_0.pdf\">assessed<\/a> that the CDL was a \u201cUnited Front-Affiliated Organization.\u201d The House Select Committee on the CCP\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/chinaselectcommittee.house.gov\/sites\/evo-subsites\/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov\/files\/evo-media-document\/uf-101-memo-final-pdf-version.pdf\">said<\/a> that \u201cUnited Front work is a unique blend of engagement, influence activities, and intelligence operations that the CCP uses to shape its political environment, including to influence other countries\u2019 policy toward the PRC and to gain access to advanced foreign technology.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The CCP State Council in 2021\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/english.www.gov.cn\/statecouncil\/sunchunlan\/202106\/03\/content_WS60b80ba1c6d0df57f98da9fc.html\">praised<\/a> the CDL, with top CCP officials congratulating the CDL and the State Council, saying that \u201cthe CDL has made important contributions to the great cause of China&#8217;s revolution, development, and reform, as well as the development of the united front work and the cause of multiparty cooperation.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The AAF report also highlighted one of the Chinese student\u2019s praise for former CCP leader Deng Xiaoping and current CCP leader Xi Jinping, and pointed out that another Chinese scientist now at a U.S. university underwent a Marxist training program prior to coming to the United States.<\/p>\n<h5><strong>Links to the Thousand Talents program aimed at stealing U.S. research<\/strong><\/h5>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Multiple Chinese students with links to the CCP\u2019s Thousand Talents program also appeared in the AAF report. The DOJ in 2020\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.justice.gov\/archives\/opa\/pr\/harvard-university-professor-and-two-chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-china-related\">stated<\/a> that \u201cChina\u2019s Thousand Talents Plan is one of the most prominent Chinese Talent recruitment plans that are designed to attract, recruit, and cultivate high-level scientific talent in furtherance of China\u2019s scientific development, economic prosperity and national security.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The DOJ also said that \u201cthese talent programs seek to lure Chinese overseas talent and foreign experts to bring their knowledge and experience to China and reward individuals for stealing proprietary information.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/06\/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf\">said<\/a> in 2018 that \u201cChina\u2019s talent recruitment strategically complements China\u2019s efforts to target emerging high technology industries\u201d and that the CCP programs \u201cinclude the Chinese Academy of Sciences\u2019 Hundred Talents Plan.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The AAF report also showed that a Chinese scientist had links to the CCP\u2019s Hundred Talents program.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The Justice Department in 2020\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.justice.gov\/archives\/opa\/press-release\/file\/1307421\/dl?inline=\">charged<\/a> Zhengdong Cheng, a Chinese national, for allegedly seeking to defraud NASA and \u201cleverage NASA grant resources to further the research of Chinese institutions.\u201d The DOJ specifically said the Chinese defendant \u201cparticipated in the PRC\u2019s Hundred Talents Plan.\u201d Cheng eventually <a href=\"https:\/\/yaf.org\/news\/former-professor-at-texas-am-university-admits-to-covering-up-relationship-with-chinese-communist-party\/\">pleaded guilty<\/a> to lying to Texas A&amp;M University after revealing his working relationship with a Chinese university and at least one business in China. Guangdong, one of the confirmed businesses Cheng was working with, is managed by the People\u2019s Republic of China.<\/p>\n<p>Local outlet KBTX <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kbtx.com\/2022\/09\/23\/former-texas-am-professor-nasa-researcher-takes-plea-deal-hiding-connections-with-china\/\">reported<\/a> that Cheng will not serve any more jail time, as he has already spent 13 months in jail. Cheng was ordered to pay restitution to NASA, in addition to a criminal fine.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The DOJ added: \u201cThe Chinese Talent Plans are programs established by the Chinese government to recruit individuals with access to or knowledge of foreign technology or intellectual property. Through these plans, the Chinese government has created a significant financial incentive for foreign, talented individuals to transfer international technology and intellectual property to China, licitly or otherwise.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uscc.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/2020-10\/Overseas_Chinese_Students_and_Scholars_in_Chinas_Drive_for_Innovation.pdf\">said<\/a> in 2020 that \u201cChina\u2019s government runs myriad programs to bring Chinese students and scholars living in the United States back to China temporarily to engage in scientific activities relevant to its economic and military modernization\u201d and that \u201cone prominent program\u201d \u2014 the Chunhui Program \u2014 \u201ctargets high-profile Chinese scholars appointed to teaching positions at prominent universities.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Yet another Chinese scientist working at an American university had been mentored by the now-former director of the Chinese National Office of the Recruitment Program of Global Experts, the AAF report showed.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The Senate Permanent Subcommittee\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.hsgac.senate.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/imo\/media\/doc\/2019-11-18%20PSI%20Staff%20Report%20-%20China%27s%20Talent%20Recruitment%20Plans.pdf\">assessed<\/a> in 2019 that \u201cthe Chinese government has refined its centrally organized foreign talent recruitment plans into a strategy to \u2018use talent to strengthen the country\u2019 by targeting the specific technology sectors\u201d and said that the \u201cRecruitment Program of Global Experts\u201d was another name for the Thousand Talents program.<\/p>\n<h5><strong>&#8220;Deep roots in the military and defense industry,&#8221; House committee says<\/strong><\/h5>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The new AAF report also highlighted that numerous Chinese scientists placed in American schools had previously attended Chinese universities with troubling histories, including multiple Chinese schools closely tied to the Chinese military and China\u2019s defense sector.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Some of the Chinese students now in the U.S. had even previously attended Northwestern Polytechnical University and Beihang University \u2014 considered to be among the CCP\u2019s so-called \u201cSeven Sons of National Defense.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The House Select Committee on China\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/chinaselectcommittee.house.gov\/sites\/evo-subsites\/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov\/files\/evo-media-document\/2024-09-23%20Research%20Security%20Report.pdf\">assessed<\/a> in 2024 that the Seven Sons are \u201cleading universities with deep roots in the military and defense industry, subordinate to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.\u201d The House committee said the Chinese ministry \u201cdrives the Party\u2019s Military-Civil Fusion strategy and the integration of civilian industries and cutting-edge technologies into the PRC\u2019s military and security ecosystems.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">\u201cThese universities are \u2018defense science, technology, and industry work units\u2019 and play a crucial role in defense research and development,\u201d the House committee added. \u201cAs many as half of the PhD graduates from the Seven Sons go on to work in the PRC\u2019s defense sector, and they spend about half of their research budgets on projects with clear military applications.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">A host of the schools previously attended by the Chinese students are also \u201cco-supervised\u201d by China\u2019s State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND). The SASTIND schools attended by the Chinese scientists in the AAF report include Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan University, Xidian University, Dalian University of Technology, Tsinghua University, Peking University, Xi\u2019an Jiaotong University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Sichuan University, and the South China University of Technology.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The House committee\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/chinaselectcommittee.house.gov\/sites\/evo-subsites\/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov\/files\/evo-media-document\/2024-09-23%20Research%20Security%20Report.pdf\">said<\/a> in 2024 that SASTIND is \u201can arm of the Chinese government whose stated purposes include \u2018strengthen[ing] military forces with additional personnel and more advanced equipment\u2019 and which seeks to leverage these universities for defense purposes.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The Chinese students employed at American universities and highlighted in the AAf report had also attended the Ocean University of China, the Beijing Institute of Nanoenergy and Nanosystems, Nankai University, and the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences. The Ocean University is\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/basicresearch.defense.gov\/Portals\/61\/Documents\/Academic%20Research%20Security%20Page\/FY24%20Section%201286%20List%20for%20public%20release_V2.pdf?ver=KqtK4tL1wLDoUwe2yxWHSw%3d%3d\">also<\/a> on the Pentagon\u2019s blacklist as being among \u201cforeign institutions engaging in problematic activity.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The House Select Committee on the CCP in 2024\u00a0also <a href=\"https:\/\/chinaselectcommittee.house.gov\/sites\/evo-subsites\/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov\/files\/evo-media-document\/2024-09-23%20Research%20Security%20Report.pdf\">said<\/a> the Beijing Institute is a \u201cproblematic Chinese institution.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\"><em>Nature Magazine<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/nature-index\/institution-outputs\/china\/people-s-liberation-army-pla\/555c2052140ba014648b456b\">assessed<\/a> that Nankai University was among \u201cthe leading collaborators with the People&#8217;s Liberation Army\u201d and among the \u201ctop five domestic collaborators\u201d with the PLA, with the Chinese Academy of Sciences ranking number one, Peking University as number two, and Nankai coming in at number three.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The University of Chinese Academy of Sciences was\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2022\/10\/13\/2022-21714\/revisions-to-the-unverified-list-clarifications-to-activities-and-criteria-that-may-lead-to\">added<\/a> to the Commerce Department\u2019s Bureau of Industry and Security\u2019s \u201cUnverified List\u201d (UVL) in 2022. The bureau said that \u201cthese foreign persons\u201d \u2014 including the Chinese university \u2014 \u201care added to the UVL because BIS or federal officials acting on BIS&#8217;s behalf were unable to verify their bona fides (\u00a0<em>i.e.,<\/em> legitimacy and reliability relating to the end use and end user of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations) through the completion of an end-use check.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The CCP-led Chinese Academy of Sciences\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/cset.georgetown.edu\/publication\/fueling-chinas-innovation-the-chinese-academy-of-sciences-and-its-role-in-the-prcs-st-ecosystem\/\">\u201cdirectly manages\u201d<\/a> the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, according to Georgetown University\u2019s Center for Security and Emerging Technology. The Bureau of Industry and Security\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2024\/05\/14\/2024-10485\/additions-of-entities-to-the-entity-list\">has<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2024\/12\/05\/2024-28267\/additions-and-modifications-to-the-entity-list-removals-from-the-validated-end-user-veu-program\">designated<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2025\/09\/16\/2025-17893\/additions-and-revisions-to-the-entity-list\">a number<\/a> of institutes within the Chinese Academy of Sciences, including the Center for Excellence in Quantum Information and Quantum Physics, the Institute of Physics, the Key Laboratory for Quantum Information, the Shanghai Institute of Microsystem and Information Technology, the Institute of Microelectronics, the National Time Service Center, and the Aerospace Information Research Institute.<\/p>\n<h5><strong>Blacklisted Huawei operations &#8220;contrary to U.S. national security,&#8221; Commerce Dep&#8217;t says<\/strong><\/h5>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The new AAF report also pointed out that multiple Chinese students working at American universities had previously collaborated on projects with researchers at the Chinese tech giant Huawei, including working with researchers at the Internal Cybersecurity Lab at Huawei.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The Commerce Department <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20190702110328\/https:\/\/www.commerce.gov\/news\/press-releases\/2019\/05\/department-commerce-announces-addition-huawei-technologies-co-ltd\">concluded<\/a> in 2019 that \u201cHuawei is engaged in activities that are contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests and its non-U.S. affiliates pose a significant risk of involvement in activities contrary to the national security of the United States.\u201d The FCC added Huawei to its\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/docs.fcc.gov\/public\/attachments\/DOC-370755A1.pdf\">blacklist<\/a> as well.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">Meng Wanzhou, Huawei\u2019s CFO and daughter of the company\u2019s co-founder, was arrested by Canadian authorities in December 2018 at the request of the U.S.,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.justice.gov\/opa\/press-release\/file\/1125021\/download\">indicted<\/a> in the Eastern District of New York in January 2019, and\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.justice.gov\/opa\/pr\/chinese-telecommunications-conglomerate-huawei-and-huawei-cfo-wanzhou-meng-charged-financial\">charged<\/a> with bank fraud and wire fraud as well as conspiracy to commit both. She was\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.justice.gov\/opa\/pr\/huawei-cfo-wanzhou-meng-admits-misleading-global-financial-institution\">allowed<\/a> to walk free by the Biden Administration in 2021.<\/p>\n<h5><strong>More students have links to blacklisted Chinese military companies<\/strong><\/h5>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The AAF report also pointed out that a Chinese scientist now working at an American university had previously worked at the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), a CCP defense conglomerate blacklisted by the U.S. government. The Chinese\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/archive.is\/2g2Aw\">state-owned<\/a> military company is\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/fortune.com\/company\/aviation-industry-corp-of-china\/\">considered<\/a> to be among the largest defense companies in the world.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">A key AVIC subsidiary known as the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation, or CATIC, has also been considered a U.S. national security threat since 1990. Then-President George H.W. Bush issued an\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/archive.is\/o\/2g2Aw\/https:\/\/www.presidency.ucsb.edu\/documents\/order-the-china-national-aero-technology-import-and-export-corporation-divestiture-mamco\">order<\/a> in January 1990 that concluded CATIC \u201cmight take action that threatens to impair the national security of the United States of America.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The House select committee on China\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/archive.is\/o\/2g2Aw\/https:\/\/www.govinfo.gov\/content\/pkg\/GPO-CRPT-105hrpt851\/html\/appbod.html\">warned<\/a> in 1998 about AVIC and its subsidiary CATIC, and the Government Accountability Office in 1996\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/archive.is\/o\/2g2Aw\/https:\/\/www.gao.gov\/assets\/nsiad-97-4.pdf\">detailed<\/a> a scheme by CATIC to get U.S.-based McDonnell Douglas to \u201cco-produce 40 MD-80 and MD-90 aircraft in China for the country\u2019s domestic \u2018trunk\u2019 routes.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">CATIC was\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/archive.is\/o\/2g2Aw\/https:\/\/www.govinfo.gov\/content\/pkg\/FR-2000-01-13\/pdf\/00-836.pdf\">charged<\/a> by the Justice Department in 1999 with violating the Export Administration Act (EAA) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act \u201cregarding details of a 1994 sale of American machining equipment, some of which was diverted to a Chinese military site.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The Commerce Department <a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2001\/05\/23\/01-13024\/action-affecting-export-privileges-tal-industries-inc-in-the-matter-of-tal-industries-inc-901\">said<\/a> in 2001 that TAL Industries was allegedly part of the &#8220;conspiracy&#8221; to export machine tools from the U.S. to CATIC.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The State Department <a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2002\/05\/07\/02-11273\/bureau-of-political-military-affairs-rescission-of-policy-of-denial-for-china-national\">said<\/a> in 2002 that most of the charges related to CATIC were dismissed, but that &#8220;TAL Industries Inc., however, was convicted of violating the EAA and was sentenced on May 11, 2001, to five years of corporate probation&#8221; and &#8220;payment of a $1 million fine.&#8221;<\/p>\n<h5><strong>Relationships include atomic weapons research<\/strong><\/h5>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The AVIC\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/archive.is\/o\/2g2Aw\/https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20151008032453\/https:\/\/www.avic.com\/en\/aboutwebsite\/contactus\/index.shtml\">website<\/a> in 2015 made it clear that its business units included \u201cdefense\u201d as well as aviation. The \u201cAVIC Evolution\u201d section\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/archive.is\/o\/2g2Aw\/https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20151005215026\/http:\/\/www.avic.com\/en\/aboutus\/history\/index.shtml\">said<\/a> the company was the successor to the Chinese government\u2019s Ministry of Aerospace Industry. AVIC\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/archive.is\/RxHpe\">has<\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/archive.is\/GOmdW\">supported<\/a> Russia during its war with Ukraine. Now-former Chinese defense minister Li Shangfu had previously been a\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/archive.is\/o\/jglPY\/https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/profile\/person\/19129169\">board member<\/a> of AVIC Avionics Equipment.<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">AVIC and its subsidiaries were\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/media.defense.gov\/2025\/Jan\/07\/2003625471\/-1\/-1\/1\/ENTITIES-IDENTIFIED-AS-CHINESE-MILITARY-COMPANIES-OPERATING-IN-THE-UNITED-STATES.PDF\">blacklisted<\/a> by the Pentagon in 2020 for being \u201cChinese Military Companies Operating in the United States.\u201d AVIC Avionics was also\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/archive.is\/o\/jglPY\/https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2021\/06\/09\/2021-12035\/notice-of-ofac-sanctions-actions\">sanctioned<\/a> by the Treasury Department in 2021 and placed on the \u201cChinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The Department of Commerce\u2019s Bureau of Industry and Security\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2020\/06\/05\/2020-10869\/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-revision-of-certain-entries-on-the-entity-list\">assessed<\/a> in 2020 that the Chinese center had been \u201cdetermined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States [&#8230;] on the basis of their procurement of U.S.-origin items for activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">The blacklist added that the Chinese center is \u201coperated by, or directly affiliated with, the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics, which is the technology complex responsible for the research, development and testing of China&#8217;s nuclear weapons.\u201d<\/p>\n<p dir=\"ltr\">\u201cAAF\u2019s goal in this research is to take America\u2019s discussion of the threat posed by China academics from somewhat academic macro-level discussions \u2014 of which there are plenty \u2014 and crystalize it into specific actionable examples of men and women who have infiltrated sensitive parts of the military research infrastructure in the United States and spur policymakers to address the problem,\u201d the AAF report said.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"node__post-content\"><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"ezoic-pub-ad-placeholder-110\">\n<div><\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Chinese students with CCP membership, military links \u2018infiltrate\u2019 U.S. universities, watchdog says Students, or spies? New report warns of &#8220;infiltration&#8221; of America&#8217;s colleges and universities by Chinese students with links to the CCP and blacklisted Chinese companies. Chinese students and scientists who are members of the Chinese Communist Party, attended schools tied to the Chinese [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[33],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-985","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-china"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sterlingcooper.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/985","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sterlingcooper.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sterlingcooper.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sterlingcooper.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sterlingcooper.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=985"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.sterlingcooper.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/985\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":986,"href":"https:\/\/www.sterlingcooper.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/985\/revisions\/986"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sterlingcooper.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=985"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sterlingcooper.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=985"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sterlingcooper.info\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=985"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}