Category Archives: Business Acquisitions

PE FIRMS HAVE 33,000 UNSOLD BUSINESSES TO EXIT-TYPICAL RETURN WAS UNDER 7% FROM SUCH INVESTMENTS!

Private Equity Is Stuck With 33,575 Unsold Businesses

Even amid a booming deal-making environment, private equity firms are unable to exit a growing number of investments at values their investors require.

The long-awaited deal-making boom has finally arrived. SpaceX set a record for the world’s largest initial public offering. David Ellison is pursuing a $110 billion deal linking Paramount with Warner Bros. The utility firm NextEra Energy has struck a deal to buy Dominion Energy that values it at more than $120 billion.

But private equity — a deal-making machine for decades — is largely sitting on the sidelines. For the third consecutive year, private equity firms are saddled with a rapidly increasing number of companies that they cannot sell or take public at the returns their investors expect.

As of June 30, private equity firms had 33,575 unsold companies in their portfolios, according to PitchBook, an industry data firm. That’s up from 32,451 companies at the end of last year and 15,923 companies a decade ago.

The growing backlog is a challenge for private equity’s core business model. Typically, such firms aim to buy a company, often add large amounts of debt to its balance sheet, improve its financial performance and then sell it for a profit, usually within five to seven years.

The state of limbo has been difficult for large investors like pension funds and endowments that have spent decades paying steep fees to private equity firms promising market-beating returns. Some investors and industry professionals are worried that the firms won’t be able to sell companies without taking big losses.

“Private equity is stuck because those companies have failed to fulfill their value promise,” said Andrew Milgram, a managing partner and chief investment officer at Marblegate Asset Management, an investment firm.

As the backlog grows, private equity firms continue to underperform the broader stock market. From July 1, 2022 to March 31, 2026, U.S. private equity firms generated annualized returns of 6.4 percent, according to the most recent data from MSCI, an index firm. That’s far below the 15.2 percent annualized returns of the S&P 500 and the 19.3 percent of the Nasdaq during the same time period.

There are several reasons for the logjam. Higher interest rates have made it difficult for private equity firms to find buyers that rely on cheap debt to finance acquisitions.

Another challenge is the weakness in the software sector, where there is a heavy concentration of private equity-owned companies. The value of many software firms has declined, as investors worry that artificial intelligence will cut into future earnings.

Historically, many private equity-owned companies have been sold to other private equity firms. But that important source of demand has also largely dried up.

When the Federal Reserve held interest rates low and debt was cheap, it was relatively easy for a private equity firm to write small checks and borrow heavily to purchase a company. But since the Fed began raising interest rates in 2022, private equity firms have needed more cash to pay down debt at the higher rates. That means the firms are not willing to spend as much to purchase companies, which drives down their valuations.

Last week, the investment behemoth Apollo Global Management reported weak quarterly results in its private equity division. The firm specifically pointed to a tricky market for company sales and I.P.O.s as a reason for its lower performance returns in that part of the business, saying exits were being “prudently delayed.”

“Buyers and sellers still have too big of a valuation gap,” said John Maldonado, managing partner at Advent International, a private equity firm.

The delays are becoming the new normal. For years now, private equity firms and their bankers have promised a rebound in either selling the businesses they own or taking them public. Such an outcome has proved elusive.

Elizabeth Cooper, global head of private equity at the law firm Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, said that going into this year, she had “a whole stable of companies” she had thought would be sold in the early part of the year. They’re still waiting.

“Everything basically got reset,” Ms. Cooper said, pointing to continued high interest rates and volatility in the stock market and politics.

Some private equity executives say the backlog may not end up being a big problem, because some companies that have taken longer to sell could ultimately generate large returns.

Still, the private equity struggles contrast sharply with the investments that venture firms — another giant source of money in private companies — have made in A.I. pioneers like OpenAI, Anthropic and SpaceX, which are generating seemingly once-in-a-lifetime returns.

The first half of 2026 was the second highest-volume period for initial public offerings in more than a decade.

But for many private equity firms, I.P.O.s have not been a viable path to selling their businesses.

Since 2022, only 70 private equity-backed companies have gone public on U.S. exchanges, according to the data firm Dealogic. From 2017 to 2021, 424 private equity-backed companies did so.

Software companies are some of the most troubled parts of the pipeline.

Many private equity firms gorged on such businesses in 2021, before the advent of ChatGPT, when software companies were trading at all-time highs. Because the exit of these companies in the current environment could lead to painful losses, many private equity firms are waiting to sell them.

In 2021, Thoma Bravo, a private equity firm invested heavily in software, bought Proofpoint, a cybersecurity software business, for $12 billion.

Thoma Bravo recently engaged in negotiations with the company’s lenders and extended the terms of its loan by two years, paying higher interest rates to do so, according to a person familiar with the deal. On calls with lenders, the person said, Proofpoint and Thoma Bravo executives said they would consider taking the company public in the coming years. But by this point in an ownership cycle, many private equity firms would try to have a clearly defined path and timeline for either an I.P.O. or a sale, rather than seeking ways to amend and extend their debt holdings.

Other companies have been lingering even longer.

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An Ancestry.com booth at a genealogical event in Salt Lake City in 2019. Blackstone, the private equity giant, purchased the company a year later.Credit…George Frey/Reuters

The giant private equity firm Blackstone bought Ancestry.com in 2020 for $4.7 billion. Six years later, Blackstone still owns the company and recently renegotiated and extended the maturities on its debt, suggesting that the firm expects an even longer holding period.

“This is a standard refinancing transaction for a highly successful investment that we’ve only owned for around five and a half years,” a Blackstone spokesperson said. “It does not indicate our future plans for the business.”

Vista Equity Partners, another private equity firm, acquired Solera Holdings, a software maker, for $6.5 billion in 2016. The company filed for an initial public offering in 2024, but it hasn’t materialized.

A representative for Vista Equity declined to comment.

Many in the industry predict that private equity firms will eventually be forced to sell and give cash back to investors, even if it means accepting a lower price.

Advent International is the rare private equity firms finding many exits. This year, it has sold several companies and taken others public, returning billions of dollars to its clients.

Mr. Maldonado, a managing partner at Advent, said he expected that other firms would have to follow suit because investors simply needed money back.

“I wouldn’t underestimate the amount of effort that’s going into dealing with the new reality and coming up with solutions that will allow firms to exit these assets,’’ he said.

WELL KNOWN PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS STUCK WITH OVER $668 BILLION IN BAD DEALS, AND 12,000 BUSINESS THEY CAN NOT SELL!!!

Deal Drought Adds To Private-Equity Costs

Private equity’s three-year deal slump has worsened a longstanding problem: billions of dollars of aging, underwater funds that continue to cost investors money.

The slowdown in mergers and acquisitions that began in 2022 has made private equity less profitable and reduced the amount of money firms return to investors. While this year began with hopes of a recovery, the slump has persisted, and shares of the biggest firms— Blackstone, Apollo Global Management  and KKR — are down 10% or more in 2025. Over the same time, the S& P 500 has risen roughly 5%.

Beyond hitting profits, the slump has delayed the timeline for private-equity firms to sell investments, adding to the pile of so-called tail-end funds, those a decade or more old.

Firms had $668 billion of private-equity assets globally stuck in tail-end funds as of the most recent data, from the end of 2023, 19% higher than the previous year, according to a forthcoming report from Treo Asset Management, a special-situations firm.

“Funds are getting older, and the holds are getting longer,” said Finbarr O’Connor, Treo’s chief investment officer and founding partner. While the report is based on data more than a year old due to a lag in when firms issue financial data, O’Connor says the trend continues, and he forecasts tail-end assets to hit $1 trillion in coming years.

Many of these deals are underwater. The Treo report showed more than a third of assets held eight years or more are worth less than the initial capital invested.

These stuck funds can be a double blow for a fund’s backers: Often unsuccessful investments that are hard to sell, they raise investor costs by extending the annual management fee for years past the usual term.

Fund limited partners are likely paying between $3 billion and $13 billion a year in management fees on the $668 billion in tail-end assets, based on the typical fee range of 0.5% to 2% of net asset value, according to Treo’s estimate. Firms often reduce a fund’s management fee from the industry-standard 2% once it enters tail-end territory— but rarely all the way to zero.

The report underscores some of the cascading effects of private equity’s exit drought. In the U.S., firms’ combined exit volume in the nearly 2½ years since the start of 2023 remains below the 2021 sum alone, according to research provider Pitch-Book Data. By 2023, U.S. firms’ median investment hold time had climbed to a record high of seven years, and it remains near the historic peak.

U.S. buyout firms held nearly 12,400 unsold companies as of the first quarter of 2025, a seven- to eight-year backlog at the current pace of sales, PitchBook says.

Private-equity investors have grappled with the problem of old, struggling investments for years.

Selling tail-end stakes on the secondary market is hard, because most buyers want bluechip assets, not old funds full of odds and ends. Continuation funds are a popular way to extend promising assets, but are less viable for those of uncertain or little value.

Removing a fund’s general partner and installing a new one to wind down the assets is something more investors are considering now amid the sales slowdown, O’Connor said. It is considered a drastic step, and happens rarely.

Often, investors have no better option than to be patient and wait for a sale. But that leaves the question of fees, and how to best motivate managers to sell and wind the fund down.

More investors “are scrutinizing the fee model” of these late-stage funds, said Runjhun Kudaisya, a partner in the private- funds group at law firm Goodwin Procter. With average fund life—which used to be 10 to 12 years—now stretching toward 15 years, “there has been a shift in the market” and fund backers increasingly try to negotiate late-stage fees CERTAINLY TIME TO STOP INVESTING WITH THE BIG NAMES. THE ONLY THINGS THEY ARE GOOD AT IS GETTING FEES!

ELON MUSK’S TAKEOVER OF TWITTER WAS BADLY PLANNED

Our takeovers and acquisitions over the last 40 years, have taught us that it is vital and necessary to conduct quiet due diligence on the publicly traded takeover target, to determine how viable it is from a financing standpoint.

Is it really a great price, and at that price is it able to be financed with the highest leverage ( loans to be structured) possible, to make it a viable acquisition, and then after all the loans taken to buy it, is there a profit still left for the new owner?

Elon Musk appears to have made an impulsive move to acquire TWITTER, without doing such simple due diligence and calculation of its financial viability.

However, his name and reputation at that time as the RICHEST person in the world ( using the over-hyped and overpriced Tesla stock as value), gave some impetus for his investment bankers to find a way to structure a really badly overpriced acquisition transaction. After all, they saw stratospheric fees and a $43 billion value.

” Elon Musk offered to buy Twitter for $54.20 a share, or about $43 billion.

“I invested in Twitter as I believe in its potential to be the platform for free speech around the globe, and I believe free speech is a societal imperative for a functioning democracy,” Musk wrote in a letter sent to Twitter Chairman Bret Taylor.”

Why would any sane (normal) buyer want to buy this business which had an adjusted stockholders’ equity of approximately $6 billion, and a pretax credit loss from operations last year of $411 million and pay $43 billion???!

Some people have more money than brains, as they say.

From a financial standpoint, there was no reason to overpay for such a weak performing business at 7 times its net worth!

There was absolutely no reason to buy it at that price or even at half that price, especially since Mr. Musk suspected that a great deal more than 5% of its accounts were actually computer bots, an not really people who could or would generate a future profit for the company!

Musk should have said to the company that he could consider an acquisition AFTER due diligence FIRST…not after. On top of all his mistakes, he agreed to a $1 billion break p fee that he would pay if he did not conclude the deal!

Are Moe, Larry and Curly his financial advisors?

Twitter alone is really a boring company. It tries to sell advertising worldwide by having readers click on links….great thought but the year before it lost $1.3 BILLION….

Now the lawsuits-he said they said-bad guy, good guy, etc…

Our suggestion, find a REAL business, like maybe one of the legacy auto companies to merge with TESLA, the auto company and have a REAL business!
Tesla could buy Renault which has a market value approximating $7 billion, and also own 44% of NISSAN! WHAT A DEAL!!!!!

Elon, call us we got some ideas for you, that will make financial sense for you, TESLA and your stockholders.

DOUBLE YOUR BUSINESS EVERY YEAR GUARANTEED!

Every business has the challenge of growing its revenues and profits, as a means of survival among its competition. This simple business model applies to every type and size of business, in every industry, in every country in the world.

Management faces the challenge, by formulating business models for the success of the business, through sales and marketing programs that may increase its revenues and profits-IF they are successful.

However, success is never assured no matter how well planned are the forecasts and presentations. Just remember back to the NEW COKE rollout of a new and improved version of the popular soda. IT WAS A TOTAL DISASTER!

Management failures of grand business growth schemes are plenty and will continue, because the best laid plans are only “guesses” and opinions of the people developing them. Nobody can predict the outcome of a marketing plan, and can only wait to see if it works, after it is implemented.

Our firm as consultants and/or principals in business acquisitions, have learned a lot over the last 40 years of how to grow the revenues of a business,country no matter what industry or country.

Our principals have owned businesses of every size with the largest having over 12,500 employees and over 300 locations, to a large NYSE public company with revenues of over $160 million, acquired via tender offer. We have been involved in valuations of businesses, liquidations, proxy contest consulting, strategic planning for acquisitions and every type of related consulting a business may require-large or small.

Our principals proposed an acquisition of a large multi-national publicly traded company with revenues in excess of $100 billion, and structured its financing, but the target instead merged with a competitor instead.